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This paper unpacks how plans are implemented in three African cities: Nairobi, Addis Ababa, and Harare.
Three planning implementation instruments form the basis of the comparison across cities. These in-
struments aim to give effect to plans and include development regulation, infrastructure investment, and
land allocation. In contrast to reading African planning efforts as a catalogue of failures, this analysis
allows us to see the many actors and complex alliances and dissonances which play out through
implementation. Here we propose the concept of ‘negotiated planning’ as a useful conceptual tool. We
argue that the concept is useful for: its departure from normative assumptions about good or proper
planning; unpacking the everyday nature of implementation; grounding and contextualising practices;
and depathologizing the African city.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Spatial planning is seen as central to ﬁxing the challenges which
rapidly urbanising cities face. Emerging consensus over the ne-
cessity and centrality of planning has been solidiﬁed through the
UN Habitat ‘New Urban Agenda Debates’, which form part of the
Habitat III preparations, and will likely feature heavily in the ﬁnal
commitments (Turok, 2016). Never has it been a better time to
question if our understanding of planning, particularly in African
cities, is sufﬁcient.
In African cities, planning is often seen as a failure. Most of the
planning literature focusses on the departures from ‘good practice’
(Myers & Murray, 2006; Pieterse, 2010). Centralised plan-making,
rigid regulations, lack of implementation capacity, abuses of hu-
man rights, corruption and many more negative traits are associ-
ated with planning and planners in African cities. It would be
irresponsible to suggest that these critiques are wholly incorrect.
However, as Goodfellow (2013) points out, the implementation of
plans across and between cities varies considerably. Variation is
even more obvious when implementation is disaggregated into
speciﬁc planning implementation tools, as we do in this paper.).
Ltd. This is an open access article uIn line with this thinking, Watson (2013) calls for a shift in
planning theory, away from normative frameworks and assess-
ments and towards a study of planning contexts and practices.
Understanding context requires unpacking particularities of places
and focussing on what is actually happening. In response to these
calls, we have explored the actual practices of plan implementation
in Nairobi, Addis Ababa and Harare across three planning imple-
mentation tools e investment in infrastructure, regulation of
development, and land allocation. These three tools are important
ways inwhich states work to materially shape urban outcomes and
implement urban plans.
We argue that planning implementation and outcomes in Afri-
can cities can best be described as ‘negotiated’. This negotiation is
not a product of discursive and collaborative decision-making to-
wards a shared vision, but rather built on persistent and power-
laden compromises, contests, and deals among various arms of
the state, civil society, and the local and international private sector
(in particular developers and lenders). It reﬂects the actions and
agendas of a whole range of stakeholders who together work to
conﬁgure a fragile system which is constituted through and co-
constitutive of each urban context.
This paper contributes to the reﬁnement of a comparative
approach in urban studies (McFarlane, 2010; Myers, 2011, 2014;
Roy, 2009; Watson, 2009a). Within the growing debate on
comparing cities (particularly in the global south), there is growingnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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sameness (Robinson, 2014). To this end, the research utilised the
multi-case method, a critical mode of inquiry within the study of
cities (Duminy et al., 2014; Yin, 2003). The purpose is both to
compare cases, recognising the incredible difference among African
cities, as well as use the cases to jointly speak into existing planning
theory.
Interviews with local and national ofﬁcials, developers, para-
statals, academics, and NGOs aimed to understand the nature of
planning implementation, paying particular attention to the actors
and practices involved. The interviews and a detailed policy review
were conducted between December 2014 and June 2015. The
structure of the paper includes a selective review of the literature
on planning in African cities. Following this, the paper unpacks the
planning implementation practices in the three cities, focussing on
the explicit and tacit negotiations among actors implicated in urban
spatial outcomes. Finally, there is a discussion on the implications
of the case ﬁndings for planning theory and practice, in particular
the value of the concept of ‘negotiated planning’.
2. Spatial planning in African cities: a review of key concepts
2.1. Spatial planning
There has been much debate about what planning is and how it
happens. Peter Hall (1992) describes planning as “the making of an
orderly sequence of action that will lead to the achievement of a
stated goal or goals” (3). Cities, Healey (2006) argues, have been
planned, using various instruments and to differing extents, since
their inception.
Spatial planning (also called physical planning) is a particular
type of planning, focused on the making of spatial order. The core
scale of the town or city is of particular signiﬁcance as it is usually at
this scale that the urban spatial planning apparatus is constructed
(Hall, 2014). Healey (2006) identiﬁes spatial planning as unique
from other forms of planning (such as economic or operational) in
its focus on spatial plans and their implementation. Spatial plans
are forward looking and two dimensional visions of how a town,
city, or region should look. Historically, master plans were the core
tool of spatial planning. Master plans are a complete spatial picture
of the future of an area (Goodfellow, 2013). Academics have criti-
cized the rationalist tendencies of master planning, advocating for
more strategic and less prescriptive planning instruments
(Fainstein, 2000; Healey, 1992; Winkler & Duminy, 2016). This has
led to a move towards spatial development frameworks, strategic
plans and other new tools.
Within the literature on urban planning implementation, focus
is generally on regulation (Goodfellow, 2013). This is largely
because it tends to be the core implementation tool which the
planning department itself has in its purview (Ennis, 1977). How-
ever, regulation is just one aspect of plan implementation. Infra-
structure investment and land allocation practices, when viewed in
conjunction with regulatory efforts, in fact make up a fuller picture
of the implementation toolbox.
This framework for thinking about urban spatial planning, in
terms of land use regulation, guided infrastructure investment and
land allocation, is particularly useful as it brings to the fore the
many tools with which states work to inﬂuence the spatial direc-
tion of urban areas. These tools are discussed in more detail below:
- Regulatory controls: Land use regulations are the rules which
indicate how land in particular areas can be used and developed
(Goodfellow, 2013). Common land use regulations include:
building codes pertaining to the development of physical
structures and the standards of construction, minimumstandards or guidelines for the provision of infrastructures (e.g.
road width, public space, service levels), zoning regulations and
schemes, density regulations including minimum plot size and
subdivision regulation and ‘ﬂoor area ratios’.
- Infrastructure investment: Infrastructure investment is the
material development of systems which provide necessary ur-
ban services. Water, sanitation, electricity, and road develop-
ment can be used to realise urban plans. Infrastructure works to
‘open up’ new areas for development or creates additional bulk
capacity where intensiﬁcation is desired.
- Land governance: Turok (2016) deﬁnes land governance as ‘the
institutions and mechanisms that allocate land to appropriate
uses within urban areas, including property rights, land valua-
tion systems and rules that control property development’ (35).
These systems have profound impacts on the spatial develop-
ment of urban areas. Most economists argue that market-based
systems are much more efﬁcient at allocating land based on the
principle of ‘best and highest use’ (Alexander, 2001).
The connected logic of these tools (and the systems which un-
derpin them) requires explanation. Turok (2016) describes this as
the ‘urban land-infrastructure-ﬁnance nexus’. This logic rests on a
reinforcing cycle of activities. The urban land use regulations set out
the criteria, indicators, standards and rules in terms of which the
state regulates land use and development. The land use and for-
ward planning frameworks guide the type and location of invest-
ment in different infrastructures. The nett effect of these two land
use activities is the creation of better living and working conditions
for society, through the promotion of a higher quality urban envi-
ronment and the rationing of opportunities for land development
by the public. This leads to more efﬁcient and increased investment
in urban land by the private and public sectors and rising land
values, which in turn leads to increased revenue to government
(and especially local government). Therein lies the inherent logic
that drives planning-led urban management: land use regulation
and planning creates land value, which translates into increased
state revenues, which then enables the state to invest more in the
human and other capabilities needed to manage and enhance the
urban environment. Where the underlying land tenure, land mar-
ket, and land governance conditions are weak or compromised, the
cycle described above cannot even begin to move. Not surprisingly,
this ideal falters when plans and regulations fail to trigger private
and public investment or when tax and budget systems fail to
capture and distribute rising values.
Spatial planning, since its inception, has embodied normative
assumptions about what makes for a ‘good city’ (Healy, 2006).
Plans, regulations, and land systems have been designed and pur-
sued with the intention of realising these normative goals. In this
case, ‘good’ takes clearly spatial and often aesthetic forms, and is
premised on the revenue-generating value of planning. Within
planning discourses, attention is not only given towhat a good plan
looks like, but also what good planning processes, to arrive at this
plan, would be. Two important themes which continue to resonate
in current debates are that planning should be based, ﬁrstly, on
evidence and data and, secondly, on participatory or collaborative
decision-making. These are dicussed below:
- Data: In the lineage of the European Enlightenment movement,
physical planning was seen as a scientiﬁc practice, the outcomes
of which could be best achieved through rational, technological,
and analytical reasoning (Healey, 2006). The logic was that data
and the scientiﬁc method should be used to inform plan-making
(Davoudi, 2006, 2012; Krizek, Forysth, & Slotterback, 2009).
Even in cases where it is recognized that planning is contested
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cornerstone of rigorous plan-making.
- Collaboration: In line with liberal democratic discourses, there
has been the rejection of top-down planning processes. Ideal
planning processes would source, rationalise, and ﬁnally incor-
porate the ideas and perspectives of all stakeholders. The lan-
guage of participation permeates much of planning discourse.
However, there is continued disagreement about methods,
tools, and the extent to which more radical agendas are
embraced or sanitized (Watson, 2013).
There are substantial critiques of both the rationalist basis of
planning (Alexander, 2001; Kamete & Lindell, 2010; Winkler &
Duminy, 2016) as well as the ‘Habermasian’ ideals underpinning
collaborative planning (Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger, 1998).
Watson (2013) writes that ‘planning debates on state-society
engagement are now in a “post-collaborative” phase, with atten-
tion shifting to the difﬁculties of these processes as well as to the
range of contexts and conditions within which participation takes
place’ (2).
Watson (2009a), referring to a growing body of literature on
‘seeing from the South’, argues for a much closer look at ‘context’
and ‘place’. Concerns, therefore, are less that normative ideologies
are inherently bad, but that they fail to take into account the actual
processes of places and contexts. Myers (2011), Pieterse (2008),
Watson (2011) and others argue that this failure to look at
context is of particular consequence to studies of African cities,
where northern and western policy thinking and theorization have
been adopted wholesale. Lemanski and Oldﬁeld (2009) call for
work which explores cities ‘as complex and contradictory sites in
which diverse residents and urban processes function in the
context of state (dis)engagement’ (pg 634). It is with this in mind
that we turn to the literature on planning in African cities.
2.2. African cities
Planning has a long and complex history in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Njoh (2004) points out that prior to the colonisation of Africa there
were many functioning towns; these towns were a subject of
fascination to and documentation by early explorers and co-
lonialists. With the expansion of European colonialism in the late
19th century, what had been small, often coastal outposts func-
tioning as fuelling or slave trading stations, burgeoned into urban
centres. Colonial centres were often geographically set apart from
the villages of the indigenous people or designed with segregated
quarters, and strictly adhered to European standards of construc-
tion and urban development (Bekker & Therborn, 2012; Njoh,
2009). European planning tools, including master plans, land use
regulations, and the formation of legal land rights systems, were
used to control where and how development could take place,
often using pseudo-scientiﬁc or social rationales (Mabogunje,
1990).
Decolonisation of African countries between the 1950s and
1970s did not dismantle European planning. The majority of plan-
ning legislation and instruments remained intact and centralised
within newly formed African states (Todes, Karam, Klug, &Malaza,
2010; Watson, 2011; Wekwete, 1995). In fact, at the behest of post-
colonial governments, planning African cities (particular capital
cities) became important sites for the exhibition of state power and
governments sought to impose upon the built environment this
quest for legitimacy (Abubakar and Doan, 2010; Adebanwi, 2012;
Bekker & Therborn, 2012; Fourchard, 2012). This often took the
form of impressive master plans and new master-planned capital
cities.
Planning in African cities has been heavily critiqued(Goodfellow, 2013; Kamete& Lindell, 2010; Pieterse, 2008). Despite
the overwhelming criticism of rigid, centralised, prescriptive
planning dated master plans and often excessive regulations are
being implemented, often at the behest of national governments
(Kauzya, 2007, pp. 75e91; McAuslan, 2013; Ndegwa & Levy, 2003;
Suzuki, Dastur, Moffatt, Yabuki, &Maruyama, 2010; Watson, 2013).
These critiques have come to form an important narrative about
planning in African cities, one which has penetrated both popular
and academic discourses. Sub-Saharan Africa has become the
poster child for urban planning gone wrong e a story of central-
isation, rigid legislation and ad hoc enforcement. Oppressive city
‘clean ups’ (Huchzermeyer, 2011; Potts, 2006; Watson, 2009b),
rampant peri-urban land speculation (Adam, 2014; Allen, 2003;
Kombe, 2005; Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002), collapsing infra-
structure networks (Gandy, 2006; Pieterse, 2008), persisting
informal settlements (Gulyani & Basset, 2007; UN Habitat, 2003),
and elite enclaves (Lemanski, 2007; Murray, 2011; Watson, 2013)
are read as signs of planning's failures in African cities.
However, many authors challenge this reading of African cities,
arguing for the need to depathologize the cities (Pieterse, 2008;
Lemanski & Oldﬁeld, 2009; Jaglin, 2014; Diouf, & Fredericks,
2014). Writing on African cities, Jaglin proposes
‘a radical change in perspective, taking as a starting point not the
failure of urban services and the institutions responsible for their
delivery, but the vitality and multiplicity of actual delivery systems
which, despite policy announcements and reforms, and notwith-
standing imported models, survive and contribute to the func-
tioning of cities.’ (434)
Inspired by this line of thinking, this paper argues for a nuanced
reading of planning in African cities. In charting three cases, we
demonstrate the ‘negotiated’ nature of spatial decision making and
outcomes. The following cases show that planning implementation
reﬂects explicit and tacit power relationships rather than a process
of explicit consensus building or data application.
The concept of ‘negotiated planning’ is useful for a number of
reasons. First, it focusses less on normative expressions of how
planning should be (i.e. informed by evidence and participation)
and more on the actual practices evident in cities. The focus on
actual practices falls in line with Southern Urban efforts to insert
the ‘ordinary’ and ‘everyday’ into urban and planning theory, thus
strengthening this debate (Harrison, 2006; Parnell & Oldﬁeld,
2014; Pieterse, 2008; Robinson, 2008; Watson, 2011). Second, it
seeks to explain these practices and outcomes with reference to
social, economic, and political processes underway in speciﬁc cities.
It allows for complex power dynamics among many stakeholders
throughout the planning implementation process to be surfaced
and the political nature of planning to be more rigorously under-
stood. Finally, it combats simple and pathologizing narratives of
African planning and plan implementation.
3. Planning implemention: three cases
Here we move to a discussion of the three case study cities.
Nairobi (Kenya), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), and Harare (Zimbabwe)
are capital cities and the largest in their respective countries. Nai-
robi and Addis Ababa are large cities, hosting more than 3.5 million
people each. Harare, on the other hand, is smaller, home to less than
2 million. However, all three are growing, experiencing increases in
the demand for urban space.
The ﬁrst plans for Nairobi were created by British colonial
planners in an effort to create a ‘settler capital’ out of a rail town.
The 1948 Master Plan for a Colonial Capital consolidated this early
vision. By the mid-1970s it became clear that the functional area of
1 The state was originally reluctant to allow subdivisions before the LBC provided
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A series of spatial plans and strategies attempted to give life to this
concept, most of which remain partially implemented. The Nairobi
City Council, with the support of the Japan International Coopera-
tion Agency (JICA), is currently drafting the Integrated Urban
Development Master Plan (NIUPLAN), to replace the 1973 strategy.
Under Kenya's 2010 constitutional dispensation, the functions of
forward planning and development control have been devolved to
county governments (section 104 (1) of the County Government
Act of 2012). Nairobi is both a city and a county. Within the newly
formed Nairobi City County (NCC), the Department of Lands,
Physical Planning and Housing is technically responsible for all
planning functions. However, the national Urban Metropolitan
Development Unit (UMDU) continues to play a central role (per-
sonal communication UMDU planner, Nairobi, April 2015).
The ﬁrst plan for Addis Ababa was drafted by the Italians during
a brief colonial stint in the 1930s (Fuller, 1996). Since then a suc-
cession of plans have shaped the development of the city, most of
which were developed by European architecture and planning
ﬁrms (Parker & Ghafur, 1991). The plans for Addis Ababa were
shaped as well by the socialist military regime in power from 1974
to 1991. As per legislation, Addis has two types of plans: city-wide
plans (a master plan for the city) and Local Development Plans
(strategies for local areas). Addis Ababa recently drafted a new city-
wide plan, the Integrated Regional Development Plan, to replace
the plan for 2004 to 2014. It has been violently resisted by the
peripheral communities which cited ‘fear of eviction’ and long
standing tribal tensions as core concerns. The 1994 Constitution of
Ethiopia granted Addis Ababa City Government powers of self-rule
within a federal system (with implications for the ﬁscal arrange-
ments in the country and city). The national frameworks for land
and planning empower Addis Ababa to make and implement urban
plans.
The city of Harare (previously Salisbury) was the subject of a
series of city wide plans under the colonial and Rhodesian gov-
ernments, as well as since independence. City planning in
Zimbabwe continued to reﬂect the pre-independence Rhodesian
government's concern with controlling urban development and
maintaining orderly spatial planning, a policy which effectively
perpetuated the race and income segregation established under the
previous regime (McAuslan, 1993). Harare continues to use the
Harare Combination Master Plan. The plan covers the greater
Harare area and provides a framework for local area plans. Dating
back to the 1980s, but periodically amended since then, the Com-
bination Master Plan is now scheduled for fundamental revision,
together with a City Development Strategy (Harare City Council,
2012). Zimbabwe's constitution, adopted in 2013, devolves plan-
ning decision-making to local governments. However, without
supporting legislation, the central government remains heavily
involved in local level planning. In Zimbabwe, the National
Department of Physical Planning (DPP) remains in control of among
other things, evaluating master plans, allocating land for state and
parastatal activities, and medium to large scale development
applications.
All three cities have urban plans (speciﬁcally master plans) and
have, at least in principle, embraced principles of decentralisation.
However, the implementation of these plans, as the following three
sections discuss, reveals a much more negotiated and complex
system. The following section unpacks three tools of implementa-
tion, development regulation, infrastructure investment and land
allocation, demonstrating how planning is negotiated in each
context.3.1. Regulation and development control
Much of urban planning has to do with regulating urban
development; many authors focus on this function as a core
component of planning implementation (Goodfellow, 2013;
Watson, 2009b). This section looks at the ways in which develop-
ment regulations are actually implemented in the three cases.
In Nairobi, the function of development control, undertaken by
NCC with some support from the UMDU, largely focusses on ap-
provals or rejections of development in line with the zoning
scheme. The last zoning review was carried out in 2004 and
resulted in the approval of 20 key zones. Both the National and local
departments claim to use the development control guidelines
provided in terms of the Physical Planning Act, the Physical Plan-
ning Handbook (Kenya Ministry of Lands and Housing, 1991) and
the Building Code of 1968.
In practice, however, ofﬁcials in the local planning department
and the UMDU noted that even when there is no infrastructure
capacity or the project fails to align with the plan, rejections are
very rare. This is due to what was described as an ‘overwhelming
need for development’ and ‘political motivations’ (personal
communication Assistant Director NCC Forward Planning 1, Nai-
robi, April 2015). Planners often enter into ad hoc commitments
with developers, requiring them to provide additional infrastruc-
ture (such as a school or community hall) if they want their
application to be approved.
Despite the high likelihood that plans will be accepted, this
process is cumbersome and often circumvented by developers.
Developers generally do not apply for development permission at
all or submit an application only very loosely resembling the
development eventually built (notable examples include important
donor headquarters and a number of prominent hotels). Within the
local planning department in the City County, a special division has
been created to address the plethora of unapproved and ‘deviant
properties’ developed across the city. The focus of this team is on
informally developed high rises (tenements) and property devel-
oped on the urban fridge by land buying companies (LBCs)
(Huchzermeyer, 2011; Charles, 2013). Tenements are often con-
structed on road reserves, public spaces, or within the set back of
another property, with scant regard for applicable land use or
building regulations. Ofﬁcials in this department retroactively
approve or reject tenement development which has been con-
structed (personal communication, NCC Forward Planning ofﬁcial
2, Nairobi, April 2015). LBCs, another focus of the special division,
are groups of households which have pooled resources to buy un-
serviced peri-urban land with the hope of eventual title
(Huchzermeyer, 2011; Yahya, 2002; personal communication,
Stanley Ndungu, Nairobi NACHU Head Ofﬁce, April 2015).1 Ofﬁcials
note that these areas are often allowed to subdivide, despite not
meeting the basic criteria. Retroactive approval, despite the failures
of tenements and LBCs to provide infrastructure and services for
their development, demonstrate the power of even small scale
developers within the regulatory system.
In Addis Ababa, the citywide plan is prepared by a special
project ofﬁce set up for this purpose. Within the City Government,
there are two sub-tiers kebeles (lower level administration) and
woredas (an administrative jurisdiction consisting of a group of
kebeles). Kebeles are empowered to administer local matters,infrastructure to their members. However, the LBCs rarely provide this infrastruc-
ture (often becoming defunct rapidly after land acquisition) and the state has
conceded to provide it through local government budgets or to allow subdividing
without infrastructure in place.
L.R. Cirolia, S. Berrisford / Habitat International 59 (2017) 71e79 75including neighbourhood maintenance and building code
enforcement. Similar to Nairobi, in Addis Ababa, Local Development
Plans (LDP) include explanatory details on the strategies, imple-
menting agencies, concrete standards, development controls,
budgets, and timeframes for implementing plans. Unlike Nairobi,
however, the majority of new development is undertaken by the
local state. Because housing delivery is dominated by the state, new
developments tend to conform to the master plan and LDPs.2 The
Building Permit and Control Authority is responsible for assuring
that all public and private development conforms to the plans and
regulations. The authority approves designs and monitors
implementation.
Importantly, no land is formally released to the state or private
developers without being serviced. This had led to a very slow
release of land and a huge gap between the supply and demand.
Almost a million households are outside of the formal system,
building informally in and around the city. Understanding the
constraint, the state has been lax on enforcing building controls
within informal and extra-legal areas. However, when areas fall
within critical parts of the master plan, the city takes swift action to
evict households which do not conform. In these cases households
are sometimes compensated for the cost of their top structure, a
question of particular concern for human rights and planning
activists.
In Harare, unlike Nairobi and Addis Ababa, stringent regulations
are applied to urban space and property development within the
city. The property boom (against the anomalous backdrop of a
failing economy) of the early 1990s gave impetus to the state's
desire to build Harare into a modern and ordered city, imposing
restrictive policies including the repression of informal trade,
informal settlements, and the minibus industry (for example
Operation Murambatsvina in 2005) (Kamete & Lindell, 2010;
Watson, 2009b). The local government plays a role in regulation;
however they are often undermined by higher levels of government
(personal communication, Harare City Council urban planning
ofﬁcial, Harare, March 2015). According to a local developer, the
building and planning standards applied by all spheres of govern-
ment to new developments are onerous, imposing high costs. The
high standards imposed in the city core exhibit stark contrast to
that on the periphery. On the periphery beyond the formal city
boundary, building regulations are not enforced and development
takes place in an ad hoc manner. In the case of housing co-
operatives, building regulations simply do not apply. Plots are
allocated without services and often with little regard for the long
term spatial implications.
The three cases reﬂect three very different regulation practices.
In Nairobi, the planners ‘strike back’, negotiating to regain lost
control and respond retroactively to the many forms of informal
building. In Addis, state-led construction, in a sea of urban infor-
mality, forms the basis of their regulatory approach, creating a
situation where (new and conforming) high quality construction is
side by side irregular slums. Control is selectively negotiated,
focussing enforcement on new building and ignoring that which
already exists. Harare, a combination of the former two, focusses
development regulation both on existing building and new build-
ing, however this regulation is spatially selective, focussed on the
core and turning a blind eye to the periphery. All three cases2 The construction sector is booming in Addis Ababa. There are very few private
real estate developers; however, the majority of development is being undertaken
by the state, by construction companies willing to build on the basis of upfront
payments from the lessors of the land, or by international investors (although this
constitutes a much smaller percentage) (personal communication Yohannes Sisay,
Sunshine Construction, Harare, March 2015).represent a statewhich can only partially regulate building through
ongoing negotiation and compromise.
3.2. Infrastructure investment
A core part of implementing urban plans is infrastructure in-
vestment. Plans often include future infrastructure investments
(especially if plans include strategies for densiﬁcation or expan-
sion). The laying of public infrastructure (or not) forms a critical
part of the realisation of plans.
The local government in Nairobi has had little ability to invest in
infrastructure due to the anti-urban bias in Kenya's revenue sharing
formula (Cira, Kamunyori, & Babijes, 2016). This impedes the pos-
sibility of surplus funding for capital expenditure (personal
communication Kathy Whimp, Nairobi, April 2015). Investment in
infrastructure and the associated development outcomes in the city
are instead shaped by national line-function parastatals, private
developers, and international development partners, each of which
are discussed below.
Many international donors and development agencies have
their regional headquarters in Nairobi and play an active role in
setting and funding the agenda. This is particularly evident in roads
and transport. For example, the major highway infrastructure such
as the Eastern, Northern, and Southern bypass roads were funded
by the Chinese government together with the national government
of Kenya. The World Bank, European Union, and the African
Development Bank are pushing for (and partially funding) a new
bus-rapid-transit (BRT) system (personal communication, Anne
Chaussavoine, European Union, Nairobi, April 2015). In contrast and
despite having the mandate to plan and implement, the County
roads department addresses residential roads (often retroactively),
focusing on drainage, junctions, trafﬁc signals, non-motorised
transport (NMT). While many donors support the devolution pro-
cess, all of the long-term donor loans are granted to the national
government of Kenya and their respective parastatal institutions,
and are thus negotiated at the national level. Notably, parastatals
play a huge role in infrastructure development in the city. Most
parastatals operating in the city are offshoots of the national gov-
ernment, such as Kenya Power, Kenya Urban Roads Authority
(KURA), and Athi Water Board. Each parastatal has its own sector
plans and infrastructure investment programmes. In the NUIPLAN,
the infrastructure plans of these parastatals have largely been
incorporated into future planning processes, creating an ‘infra-
structure leads planning’ approach to development.
Parastatals and donors tend to provide the high level infra-
structure which creates the shape of the city; however, patches
within this structure are left un-serviced. As a response, private
developers play a substantial role in the provision of infrastructure,
albeit largely for their own developments. Along the major road
network, developers provide their own infrastructure such as
boreholes, septic tanks, and solar panels, unlocking land otherwise
undevelopable. ‘Lifestyle estates’ and ‘new suburbs’ funded by
global and local investors, are common drivers of this development.
Examples include Thika Greens Golf City, Garden Cities, Four Ways
Junction, and Tatu City (personal communication, Julius Orowe,
Tatu City, April 2015). In this way, developers reinforce high level
urban plans, ﬁlling the spaces ignored by major funders and
parastatals.
In contrast to Nairobi, infrastructure investment in Addis Ababa
follows the forward planning agenda set forth in the master plan
for the city (thus planning leads investment). Extremely advanta-
geous revenue sharing privileges with the central government, the
conferring of Charter City status (No. 87/97), and the ability for the
city to raise revenue through taxes and other instruments have
enabled Addis Ababa to have the ﬁnancial capacity to invest in their
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international donors are also increasingly investing in the high
level infrastructure of the city in line with the urban regeneration
project. The most important cases are the Chines-ﬁnanced Light
Rail Transit system (LRT) which is under the ownership of the
newly established Ethiopian Railways Corporation (ERC). By con-
trolling the ﬁnance, individual sectors’ infrastructure investments
are compelled to alignwith these plans. It is possible to compel this
alignment because, aside from electricity, the well-funded City
Government owns and operates the majority of the infrastructure
assets (for example, roads and water assets).
As noted in the above sections, the City Government embarked
on a scaled urban regeneration project, including the redevelop-
ment and infrastructure investment on fourteen inner city sites
(personal communication Ato Hassen, Addis Ababa City Adminis-
tration, Addis Ababa, April 2015). Most of the sites house informal
or unplanned settlements. Most of these programmes involve the
relocation of residents who currently reside on the redevelopment
land. This redevelopment process has been coupled with a huge
expansion of the road infrastructure and a planned decentralisation
of economic activity (achieved through the direct allocation of land
for commercial and industrial uses within assigned hubs, as dis-
cussed in the following section).
Much like Nairobi, the local government in Harare holds little
power over infrastructure provision, being reliant on national
government and parastatals to provide funding and services. On the
back of economic collapse in the 1990s (and the subsequent string
of unsuccessful economic reforms) Harare, as well as the national
infrastructure parastatals fromwhich the city relies, have had little
capital to distribute and invest (personal communication, Regis
Makwembere Revenue Collection City of Harare, Harare, March
2015). Given the dire lack of funds for infrastructure and the lack of
interest of international investors, developers are often required by
local planning authorities to build both on-site and off-site infra-
structure. However, developers, relying on commercial ﬁnance, face
the high risk brought about by rapid inﬂation and interest rate
ﬂuctuation, therefore preferring short term borrowing to longer
term exposure (personal communication, Darlington Chirima, ZB
Bank, March 2015). It is therefore also not possible for the private
developers to provide scaled infrastructure to support large pro-
jects or the larger network of the city. They contribute bits and
pieces to the infrastructure network, most of which directly serves
very small scale development projects.
While Harare's master plan purports to develop a World Class
City, the Government of Zimbabwe has commissioned plans for a
new capital city in the Greater Harare City region approximately
25 km away from the Harare central business area (personal
communication Percy Toriro, independent town planner Harare,
March 2015). The new capital is intended to replace Harare as the
centre for political activity, housing a new parliament and various
social and economic nodes. While this plan will likely be nothing
more than one of Watson’s (2013) ‘fantasy cities’, it represents a
clear effort on the part of the national government to divert what
little funds are available from Harare to other areas. In practical
terms however the Government of Harare is struggling to assemble
the capital to ﬁnance the access road to the site of the proposed
new capital, not with standing the commitment of the Chinese
government to provide USD 200 million for the construction of a
new parliament building (www.newsday.co.zw, 31 August 2016).
These cases show that the capacity and interest of the state to
invest in urban infrastructure is a fundamental (though often
ignored) part the implementation of urban plans. Furthermore,
these cases show that infrastructure investment is not driven by the
state alone, but reﬂects negotiations between the government,
parastatals, ﬁnanciers, and developers. In the case of Nairobi, majorloans are granted by foreign governments and donors to the na-
tional government to invest in high level urban infrastructure. This
process (perhaps intentionally) undermines the local government's
role in infrastructure investment and entrusts in developers the
role of ‘ﬁlling in’ the city's structure. In Addis Ababa, the desire to
showcase a national and regional success story forms a central
plank in the investment strategy of the city and its supporting
funders. Addis Ababa leads the servicing of all formally released
land and provides high quality public infrastructure at scale. In
Harare, in contrast, the desire of the national government to un-
dermine the development of the city (traditionally an opposition
strong hold) is also unlikely to be coincidental. However, in reality
the acute shortage of ﬁnance continues to undercut the national
government's capacity to exert its urban planning ambitions. These
cases show that infrastructure investment reﬂects not only the
technical context of the state (the varied extent to which there is or
is notmoney available for infrastructure), but also forms the basis of
an expression of control and power, the outcome of which is a
negotiation between donors, investors, the state and even
communities.
3.3. Land management
It is not possible to discuss all aspects of land governance or
management for each case. We focus instead on land allocation.
How land is allocated (directly by the state, through the market, or
in some combination) has direct implications on the outcomes of
urban planning processes.
Competition over urban land in Nairobi is ﬁerce and determined
by and large by the open market. Land for development is bought
on the openmarket, often through partially informal processes. The
long history of land grabbing in Nairobi e where public land was
irregularly sold to private individuals e is testament to the perva-
siveness of market forces (Klopp, 2000). Over the past few years,
the value of strategically located urban land in and around Nairobi
has skyrocketed. In the past ﬁve years plots along major infra-
structure corridors have more than doubled and across the city
property prices have increased by an average 25 percent per year.
While some research agencies suggest that this process could be
driven by real demand (such as a growing African middle class
within Nairobi) (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa,
2014), a number of interviewees argue that increases are the result
of market speculation, fuelled by overseas investors. Efforts to curb
land speculation have been minimal, with many ofﬁcials and pol-
iticians taking part in the scramble (personal communication NCC
Forward Planning ofﬁcial 2, Nairobi, April 2015). Efforts by the
National Land Commission to curb irregular land sales and rectify
‘grabbed land’ have proved complex and costly.
Of the three cases, Addis Ababa has the most complex and
comprehensive land allocation system, based entirely on a lease-
hold system. In Addis Ababa, land leasing has allowed the city near
total control of spatial development (Goodfellow, 2015). The City
leases land in two ways. First there is direct allocation wherein a
‘base price’ for the land servicing is paid. Second there is land
auction, where land is sold to bidders (Yntiso, 2008). In Addis
Ababa, 94% of land is allocated directly for activities and develop-
ment seen to be of strategic importance (Kaganova & Zenebe,
2014). Housing is one strategic area; the state allocates its own
land for condominium style development or to housing co-
operatives for private construction (Yntiso, 2008). Since there is
little land released to open market, this has constrained supply
dramatically. Due in part to the slow release of land (brought about
by the requirement to ﬁrst service land before auction or alloca-
tion), farmers on the edges of the city have taken to illegally sub-
dividing their plots and selling off the parcels directly to buyers. The
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informal alternative.
Harare, as an urban council, is given little control over land
allocation (save the basic ability to sell land to developers)
(Marongwe et al., 2011). Urban expansion of Harare's functional
areas is driven by the national government which has the power to
expropriate commercial farmland and allocate it for urban devel-
opment purposes (see the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in
Marongwe et al., 2011; Tibaijuka, 2005). The majority of land allo-
cation is given to housing cooperatives in peri-urban areas, such as
Caledonia, Whitecliffe and Southlea Park (Chirisa, Gaza Bandauko,
2014). However, the state is not the only actor extending the city
into the peri urban surroundings, private developers bypass the
delimitation laws (i.e. the urban edge) by building developments in
peri-urban areas surrounding the city which are formally desig-
nated as ‘rural’ but, for all intents and purposes, are urban. These
developers are colloquially called ‘land barons’ (personal commu-
nication Precious Shumba, Harare Resident's Trust, Harare, March
2015). Rural district councils wherein these developments take
place beneﬁt; they are often able to charge property tax for these
developments, without having to provide the infrastructure in re-
turn (such as in areas such as Greensyke).
Land allocation powers offer a unique tool bywhich to shape the
city. In the case of Addis Ababa, this allocation is central to planning
efforts given the state's full ownership of land. However, the
requirement of servicing land before it can be released strains
supply leading to informal land access routes. In Harare, in contrast,
state-led land allocation is conﬁned to the peri-urban areas and
relatively ineffective in spatially guiding the city due to its ad hoc
nature. In Nairobi, the most extreme case, no direct land allocation
takes place and the (formal and informal) market serves as the
allocating mechanism. It is interesting that in Nairobi and Addis
Ababa, the price of land on the open market is incredibly high; the
latter being driven by the governmental control of the supply and
the former being linked to rampant speculation and a complete lack
of government intervention in the land market. These cases show
that the allocation of urban land can take place in many ways and
reﬂects negotiated, informal or ad hoc practices of actors such as
ofﬁcials (Nairobi and Addis Ababa), farmers (Addis Ababa), and
‘land barons’ (Harare).
4. Negotiated planning: reﬂections and conclusions
It is clear that planning implementation is different in each of
the cities discussed above. However, in each case, planning is not
simply an ad hoc process, with no sense or logic. Instead, planning
implementation reﬂects the unique and particular context, contest
and on-going negotiation among the stakeholders implicated in
realising urban plans.
In Nairobi, international funders - working with the national
government - are investing at scale in the road network in and
around the city, opening up previously inaccessible areas and
creating the new city structure. The national government is playing
a very active role in shaping the high level urban patterns by taking
on large loans to pay for these projectse a tacit collaborationwhich
should not be overlooked. However, these efforts remain incom-
plete and selective. The state expects developers (both formal and
informal) to provide services on a project by project basis, and even
beyond their projects. There is little expectation that the state will
provide some sort of central network of infrastructure. However,
even this is not set in stone and, when the sensitive and fractured
model falters, the state breaks its own planning and development
rules to enable ongoing development. A similar process of negoti-
ated legality is reﬂected in the retroactive approval and demolition
of unapproved properties; the local government appears to beconstantly chasing the development of the city, seeking, where
possible to regain some of its lost power.
In contrast, the state in Addis Ababa, has a strong ability to
forward plan and the resources to invest in both infrastructure and
property development (such as condominium housing). Using a
tailored land allocation and expropriation system, and tapping into
substantial capital for infrastructure and land development, the
state can construct (and deconstruct) the city to match the master
plans. With practically no private development sector, the con-
struction of property can also be tightly controlled to ﬁt with the
plan for the city. This story sits in contrast to narratives of ‘failed
states’ and crumbling local governments which characterise pop-
ular thinking on African cities. However, the power of the state is
not uncontested. Tensions between the city and the resident
communities in the surrounding area, resulting in scaled protest
and violence, represent a challenge to state power. For two years
the state has remained unable to implement the new master plan
due to community backlash. In addition, the prevalence of infor-
mality demonstrates the limits of the state's control over the
regulation of existing development and the negotiated nature of
urban outcomes in Addis Ababa.
In contrast to both of the above cases, Harare experiences very
little investment in infrastructure given the lack of budget, weak
interest of international funders, and low capacity of the private
sector. While state led land allocation forms an important part of
urban expansion, it is difﬁcult to assess if this land allocation aligns
with the plans for the city or instead reﬂects patronage efforts.
Harare's local government, unable to participate in infrastructure
investment or land allocation, ﬁxates on planning and building
regulations, working to control both newand existing development
in the core urban area. This control is juxtaposed with the peri-
urban areas where no regulation is enforced. These efforts are a
negotiation wherein the local government exercises selective
spatial control.
It is not useful to categorise the planning in each city e in fact
they do not represent discrete categories which can be given simple
slogans. Differences in the cases exist not as cases of ‘all or nothing’
outcomes, but along spectra, creating what might be better
considered as assemblage or conﬁguration of planning imple-
mentation (a la Jaglin, 2014).
By beginning with the actual practices and contexts in each city,
a number of important issues are brought to the fore. First, the
negotiated nature of planning implementation has a clearly spatial
logic. The negotiationwhich takes place in the core of urban areas is
markedly different from what takes place in the suburbs, or peri-
urban fringe. Different actors and power dynamics are clearly
involved. Second, negotiation is not simple between the planning
departments and developers (as is commonly understood). While
this relationship is important, there are also important and power-
laden negotiations which take place with donors, funders, various
spheres of government, and mobilized citizens. Finally, each
context has a particular logic. While the logics do not alignwith the
‘virtuous cycle’ of planning, infrastructure, and land which un-
derpins much of western planning discourses, they are not
impossible to understand or track.
Undoubtedly, the ability and will of the state to control urban
space has not resulted in the order envisaged by the early architects
of the planning discipline or by planners themselves. The planning
outcomes in African cities do not reﬂect clear patterns of data
driven decision making or stakeholder consensus. As these cases
show, it is precisely the recognition that the state exercises limited,
constrained, and contested control that we seek to call planning in
African cities ‘negotiated’. Undeniably, efforts to improve the
planning of African cities must begin by understanding this
negotiated-ness as it is key to understanding the possibilities and
L.R. Cirolia, S. Berrisford / Habitat International 59 (2017) 71e7978limitations of change.
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